Hatch
v. Office of Personnel
Management
BN-0831-03-0056-I-1
November 12, 2004
Retirement Annuities - OWCP
benefits
Statutory/Regulatory Interpretation
- applicability of Chevron deference
HOLDING:
Retirement benefits must be based on the actual nature of an
employee’s service, rather than on an incorrect characterization of
that service in personnel documents; 5 C.F.R. § 831.703(b) defines
full-time service as any actual service in which the employee is
scheduled to work the number of hours and days required by the
administrative workweek for his or her grade or class, while it
defines part-time service as any actual service performed on a less
than full-time basis, by an individual whose appointment describes a
regularly schedules tour of duty; in determining the appellant’s
retirement benefits, the Board will consider the appellant’s personnel
documents as evidence concerning the nature of his service; in
Chevron, the Supreme Court held that when Congress explicitly left
a gap for the agency to fill, there was an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation, and legislative regulations filling the gap
were to be given controlling weight unless they were arbitrary,
capricious, or contrary to the statute; the Court also indicated that,
even when the delegation was implicit, a court was not free to
substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a
reasonable interpretation by the agency; Chevron, however,
considered the effect of legislative regulations that were the product
of the formal notice and comment rulemaking proceedings, and the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Butterbaugh v. Department of
Justice, stated that agency interpretations that are not the
product of such proceedings and may not be entitled to the same
weight; the court has specifically found that agency personnel
policies embodied in informal sources such as handbooks and directives
do not ordinarily merit Chevron deference; the Board found that
an OPM Retirement and Insurance Letter (RIL) was not entitled to
Chevron deference, and accorded only a lesser degree of deference
proportional to its power to persuade, depending on such factors as
its thoroughness, logic, expertness, and fit with prior
interpretations.
The
appellant began working for the U.S. Postal Service as a full-time
employee in September 1966. He was injured on the job on October 13,
1990, and was carried on the rolls in a LWOP status for nearly 3
years. During this time, he received payments from OWCP. On October
12, 1993, he returned to work, and on September 3, 2002, he retired.
Sometime on or before November 15, 2003, the appellant received an
“Annuity Statement” from OPM indicating that his gross monthly annuity
was lower than he had expected. On inquiring into the matter, he was
told by an OPM official that the figure was accurate because the
appellant had been a part-time employee. The appellant then informed
OPM that he had not been a part-time employee, and he had instead been
a full-time employee “receiving partial OWCP payments,” and he
enclosed a statement from his former employer indicating that,
although he had worked only 4 hours of his 8-hour-a-day shift on his
return from LWOP, he had received OWCP payments covering the other 4
hours. The statement indicated further that the appellant had been
assigned to a full-time position with the intent that he would
increase his hours to 8 as he recovered.
OPM
responded to the appellant’s assertions by issuing a reconsideration
decision affirming its earlier determination. Specifically, it found
that the appellant had been a part-time employee following his return
to work in 1993 and that his retirement annuity therefore was to be
reduced in accordance with 5 U.S.C. § 8339(p)(1). The appellant then
filed an appeal with the Board, and the administrative judge to whom
the appeal was assigned issued an initial decision reversing the
reconsideration decision and finding that the appellant was entitled
to have his service from October 12, 1993, until his retirement
credited as full-time service for retirement purposes. OPM filed a
petition for review of the initial decision
In
his initial decision, the administrative judge found that 5 U.S.C.
§ 8332(f) was applicable. The first sentence of that paragraph
provides that “[c]redit shall be allowed for leaves of absence without
pay granted an employee … while receiving benefits under subchapter I
of chapter 81 of this title.” The administrative judge noted that the
Postal Service had certified that the appellant served under a
full-time appointment; he stated that OPM had identified no authority
prohibiting the granting of LWOP to an employee receiving OWCP
benefits; and he concluded that OPM was required by 5 U.S.C. § 8332(f)
to credit the time during which the appellant was on LWOP and
receiving those benefits.
OPM
argued that, despite the Postal Service’s characterization of the
appellant’s position as full-time, the appellant in fact held a
part-time position from 1993 until his retirement. In support of this
argument, OPM asserted the appellant had a prearranged tour of duty of
only 4 hours a day beginning in October 1993; that an employee’s
entitlement to retirement benefits must be determined on the basis of
the actual nature of the appellant’s service, rather than on the basis
of the employing agency’s characterization of that service, and that
the appellant’s 4-hour-a-day schedule met the definition of “part-time
service” that is stated in 5 C.F.R. § 831.703(b).
The
Board agreed that because the appellant evidently never worked more
than 4 hours a day, and because he was not expected to do so until his
medical condition improved sufficiently, he could be viewed as having
not been “scheduled to work” the normal 8 hours a day expected of
full-time Postal Service employees, and his service during the time at
issue could be viewed as part-time.
Nevertheless, in determining the appellant’s retirement benefits, the
Board stated it would consider the appellant’s personnel documents as
evidence concerning the nature of his service. In that regard, the
Board found nothing in the record indicating the appellant’s
appointment was ever changed to part-time, and forms documenting the
appellant’s employment in the years prior to his retirement indicate
that he was a full-time employee. The record also did not indicate
that the positions to which the appellant was assigned during this
period of time were part-time positions. In fact, a Postal Service
human resources specialist stated that the appellant was assigned to
“an 8 hour position,” i.e., a full-time position; she stated further
that the appellant was expected to increase his work time from 4 to 8
hours a day as his condition improved; and OPM did not challenge the
appellant’s assertion that his condition was reevaluated “at least
yearly [from October 1993] through his retirement date.” Under these
circumstances, the Board found it seemed more accurate to say that the
appellant was scheduled to work the normal administrative workweek of
40 hours, but that he was given leave 4 hours a day because of his
continuing medical inability to work full days. The fact that the
appellant never recovered sufficiently to work full 8-hour days,
despite expectations that he would do so, did not establish that he
was a part-time employee, for retirement purposes, from 1993 until his
retirement.
OPM
argued further that 5 U.S.C. § 8332(f) covers employees who return to
work following a separation, and that, because the appellant was not
separated during the period from October 12, 1993, until the time of
his retirement, he could not receive service credit under that
paragraph. The Board found this argument was based on the second
sentence of 5 U.S.C. § 8332(f), which provides as follows: “An
employee or former employee who returns to duty after a period of
separation is deemed, for the purpose of this subsection, to have been
in a leave of absence without pay for that part of the period in which
he was receiving [OWCP] benefits ….”
The
Board did not construe 5 U.S.C. § 8332(f) as providing that only
employees who have been separated are entitled to receive credit for
the time they were receiving OWCP benefits. The Board noted an agency
obviously can grant LWOP only to persons who are on its employment
rolls; there would be no need for a person who is not currently
employed to be given leave from any position. The Board found that
the purpose of the sentence quoted above is to provide service credit
for time when a person did not in fact receive LWOP because he was not
an employee. Because the appellant was not separated, and because he
instead continued his employment throughout the time at issue, the
Board found the sentence on which OPM relied was simply
inapplicable.
In
addition, OPM argued that 5 U.S.C. § 8332(f) “clearly intends that
credit be granted only for periods during which the employee cannot
report for duty at all,” and that employees receive retirement service
credit for LWOP periods only if they return to duty on a
full-time basis.
The
Board saw no merit in either of these arguments. OPM cited no
authority in support of the argument that credit may be given only for
periods when the employee cannot report for duty at all, and the plain
language of 5 U.S.C. § 8332(f) imposes no such limitation.
Finally, OPM argued that the Board “should defer to [its] implementing
regulations unless they are plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
act in question,” and it cited Chevron, U.S.A.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984),
for the proposition that, “where Congress has not directly addressed
the precise question at issue, a reviewing forum should not simply
impose its own construction of a statute, particularly where the
administration of a congressionally created program necessarily
requires an administrative agency to formulate policy and make rules
to fill implicit and explicit gaps.”
The
Board found, however, that the Court in Chevron was considering
the effect of “legislative regulations,” i.e., regulations that were
the product of formal, “notice and comment” rulemaking proceedings,
and noted that the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit has indicated that agency interpretations that are not the
product of such proceedings may not be entitled to the same weight.
In this connection, the Board noted the court has stated “agency
personnel policies embodied in informal sources such as handbooks and
directives … do not ordinarily merit Chevron deference.”
Id.
In
this case, the Board found no basis for finding that Congress
“explicitly left a gap” with respect to the crediting of service such
as that at issue, or that it otherwise expressly delegated to OPM the
authority to promulgate regulations on that particular subject. More
important, the only formally promulgated rule or regulation OPM cited
in support of its position was 5 C.F.R. § 831.703(b), in which
full-time and part-time service are defined. The Board found those
definitions did not support OPM’s position, and that the only general
guidance OPM had issued on the matter at issue was Retirement and
Insurance Letter (RIL) 2002-21, issued on October 2, 2002, which
appeared to be an internal letter OPM had issued to its employees,
providing guidance on the crediting of service for retirement
purposes. The Board stated such a document clearly is not entitled to
Chevron deference. Rather, it is accorded only “a lesser
degree of deference proportional to its power to persuade,” depending
on such factors as its “thoroughness, logic, expertness, and fit with
prior interpretations.” The Board did not find RIL 2002-21
persuasive.
Rather, the Board found the plain language of 5 U.S.C. § 8332(f)
supported the appellant’s position that an employee who returns to
duty in his full-time position following a compensable injury is
entitled to full credit for his service in that position, even if he
is receiving OWCP benefits for the hours exceeding those he is able to
work. Accordingly, the Board found the appellant was entitled to full
credit for his service from October 12, 1993, until September 3,
2002.